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‘Study reveals that, even at the social level, memory is a structure of forgetfulness’ (Rousso 1991: 4). 
 
 
Introduction 
A pedestrian strolling down the Canebière towards the Vieux Port of Marseilles might 
be forgiven for overlooking one of the more discreet landmarks in the city’s memorial 
landscape: the plaque opposite the Palais de la Bourse commemorating the double 
assassination of Alexander I, King of Yugoslavia, and Louis Barthou, the French 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, who were shot dead by a Croation nationalist at the foot of 
the Canebière, a few hundred yards from the Quai des Belges, on 9 October 1934 
(Borne & Dubief 1989: 120; Berstein 1988: 157). Disguised as public lighting and 
designed to merge into the urban landscape, the plaque does little to draw attention to 
itself. The pedestrian would have to glance skywards to notice the inscription: ‘Here the 
valiant King Alexander of Yugoslavia, friend of Marseille and of France, and President 
Louis Barthou, laid down their lives for peace and liberty ... 9 October 1934’1 [see 
figure one]. 
 
In hindsight, political commentators and historians have seen the events of 1934 as an 
early portent of war, ‘a premonition of a broader tragedy which was to be unleashed 
                                                
1 ‘Ici sont tombés pour la paix et la liberté le roi preux Alexandre de Yougoslavie, ami de Marseille et de 
la France et le Président Louis Barthou ... 9 octobre 1934.’ All translations are the author’s own unless 
otherwise indicated.  
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upon the world five or six years later’ (Busquet 1998: 386),2 highlighting the contrast 
between the profound political repercussions of the tragedy and its muted memorial 
treatment. The relegation of the regicide to the minor genre of public memorialism—the 
commemorative plaque (Dutour 2006)—and its neglect through non-observance, are 
apparent anomalies that raise issues of universal relevance beyond the particulars of the 
present case study: about the preservation of traumatic memories, especially those 
tainted by political violence with an adverse impact on group, institutional or 
community identities; about the conflicting claims of national, regional and local 
commemorative agencies over sites of memory located on the periphery of the national 
arena; and, lastly, about the appropriation of monuments and memorials’ symbolic 
power by dissident voices at times of social crisis or hiatus and their use in the 
construction of counter-narratives to ‘official memory.’ 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Alexander I memorial plaque © Matthew Graves 
                                                
2 ‘Il fut comme une prémonition d’une tragédie plus vaste qui, cinq ou six ans plus tard, devait se 
déployer sur le monde.’  
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Alexander I was on a state visit to France, at the invitation of President of the Council of 
Ministers Gaston Doumergue and President of the Republic Albert Lebrun. Louis 
Barthou, who had previously travelled to Belgrade in June 1934 to negotiate a 
multilateral security pact with Yugoslavia, was the King’s official host, greeting him as 
he disembarked from the cruiser Dubrovnik on the Quai des Belges minutes before the 
drama. The shuttle diplomacy was part of Barthou’s strategy of containment of Hitlerian 
Germany aimed at reconciling differences between Yugoslavia and Italy as a 
prerequisite to drawing Mussolini’s Italy into a security pact with the countries of the 
Little Entente, brokered and guaranteed by France. Marseilles was to have been the 
showcase first leg of the royal visit: a summit meeting had been planned with Président 
du Conseil Gaston Doumergue in Paris the next day, on 10 October. But that was 
precluded by the assassination of Alexander I and Barthou the day before. 
 
The choice of Marseilles as a point of arrival is significant in terms of political 
symbolism. Alexander Karagjorgjevic (1888–1934), ‘the friend of France,’ was a 
former St Cyrien who had distinguished himself as the supreme commander of the 
Serbian Army in the Balkan campaign against Austro-German forces during World War 
One, serving alongside Marshal Franchet d’Esperey, commander of the Allied armies in 
Eastern Europe. The Armée d’Orient had embarked from Marseilles and was 
commemorated by the Monument aux morts de l’Armée d’Orient et des terres lointaines, 
designed by the Marseilles architect and WWI veteran Gaston Castel, and inaugurated 
by President Gaston Doumergue on 24 April 1927 (Drocourt 1988: 78–80). That 
monument was to have provided the focal point of the King’s visit to the city: the 
planned itinerary included a wreath-laying ceremony intended to underline Franco-
Yugoslavian amity at the site on the Corniche in the presence of veterans of the 
campaign. Morevover, a ceremonial sequel had been planned for the Paris leg of the 
state visit where Alexander was to have previewed a statue to his father, Peter I of 
Yugoslavia. If memorials provided the backdrop to Alexander’s visit, as we shall see, 
they were soon to come to the fore in the political struggle between Paris and Marseilles 
over the ‘rights to remembrance.’ 
 
In France, the political fall-out from the assassination was substantial and wide-ranging. 
It led directly to the resignations of Albert Sarraut, the French Minister of the Interior 
and of Jean Berthoin, Director of the National Police (la Sûreté nationale), as well as to 
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the suspension of the Prefect for the Department of the Bouches-du-Rhône. Having lost 
his two leading ministers, Doumergue, who had emerged from semi-retirement to lead 
the government after the anti-Republican riots of 6 February 1934, resigned in his turn 
on 8 November 1934, but not before appointing Pierre Laval to replace Barthou as 
Foreign Minister. The diplomatic consequences of the Germanophile Laval’s 
appointment were to be the progressive abandonment of Barthou’s policy aimed at the 
encirclement and containment of Germany and the adoption of a more conciliatory 
attitude to the fascist regimes (Warner 1968: 60–61). 
 
The international impact of Alexander and Barthou’s deaths was equally far-reaching. 
The event dominated news headlines around the world, making media history as the 
first political assassination to be captured on newreel (McNamee 1934). One 
contemporary commentator, R.W. Seton-Watson, compared the political significance of 
the assassination to that of Archeduke Franz Ferdinand at Sarajevo in 1914 (1935: 34). 
Anthony Eden subsequently declared that 9 October 1934 was the day when the first 
shots were fired in the Second World War (1962: 8), an opinion shared by Harold 
Macmillan (1966: 161). In a grim assessment of the diplomatic fallout from the 
assassination, the Foreign Secretary Sir John Simon informed the British cabinet that 
the government of Yugoslavia had been effectively decapitated: since Alexander’s 
successor Peter II was still a minor, Yugoslavia would be governed by a regency, with 
unpredictable consequences (Cabinet 1934: 28). On reaching New York, the news 
provoked a crash on Wall Street. In short, the event appears of greater historical 
moment than the modesty of its commemorative materialisation and its place in the 
history manuals would allow.3 For instance, in the seventeenth edition of Bouillon, 
Sorlin and Rudel’s 700 page Le Monde Contemporain (1968), a standard history 
textbook for French secondary schools, the assassination is relegated to a laconic 
footnote: ‘(I) Louis Barthou was assassinated in Marseilles in October 1934 along with 
King Alexander of Yugoslavia whom he had gone there to greet’ (215).’4 And while the 
                                                
3 For the view that the killing of Alexander and Barthou set in motion the chain of events leading to the 
Second World War see Deac (1998: 18). 
4 ‘(I) Louis Barthou fut assassiné à Marseille en octobre 1934, en même temps que le roi Alexandre de 
Yougoslavie qu’il était allé accueillir.’ Published by Bordas in 1968, this edition of the school textbook is 
divided into three sections: World History 1914–1945; the Great Civilisations of the World; and Primary 
Source Documents. The regicide is discussed in the first of the sections, written by Jacques Bouillon (a 
lecturer at the Institut d’Etudes Politiques in Paris and Professeur agrégé d’Histoire at the Lycée Henri 
IV) in a chapter devoted to international relations from 1930 to 1939, under the sub-heading ‘Les échecs 
de la Sécurité Collective (1931–36).’  
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formula is modulated in subsequent editions,5 the reason for Barthou’s disappearance 
from the international scene is consistently sidelined, so that the discontinuity in French 
foreign policy is barely accounted for, whereas an earlier assassination, that of 
Chancellor Dollfuss by Austrian Nazis in July 1934, is foregrounded as the more 
significant international event.6 
 
In Philippe Joutard’s Histoire de Marseille en Treize Evénements, the assassination is 
excluded from the list of landmark events that make up the city’s 2,600-year history, 
from its foundation to the present day. In the twentieth century, that place was taken by 
the Colonial Exhibiton of 1906, and the infamous Nazi-Vichy épuration or ‘cleansing’ 
of 22-23 January 1943 (Joutard 1998: 194) which saw the Panier—the old quarter 
overlooking the Vieux Port—dynamited, and 1,400 of its 20,000 displaced inhabitants 
deported to concentration camps.7 The assassination is mentioned only in passing as a 
traumatic memory, one that contributed to the ‘mauvaise réputation’ of Marseilles in 
modern times (197). Yet even that memory has faded from the collective consciousness 
of the city. It is absent from the realms of communicative memory—seventy-five years 
on the last living eye-witnesses were children (or at most adolescents) in 1934 and their 
testimony has gone largely unrecorded—as well as from the arena of public ceremonial: 
there is no trace of commemorative observance, either official or unofficial, continuing 
at the memorial sites beyond the early 1940s. 
                                                
5 Compare the treatment of the regicide and Barthou’s ministry in the 1968 edition with the 1980 edition. 
On first reading, the episode is repeated almost verbatim, but there is a subtle semantic shift in the later 
edition: ‘Mais le successeur de Barthou, assassiné à Marseille en même temps que le roi Alexandre 1er de 
Yougoslavie, Pierre Laval, tout en affirmant poursuivre la même politique, en infléchit l’orientation’ 
(302-4). The suppression of the adverb, the integration of the footnote into the main text, the awkward 
syntax, all suggest a modulation of Laval’s responsibility in the redirection of French foreign policy after 
October 1934. The memory of Barthou becomes indistinguishable from that of his successor Pierre Laval; 
France is robbed of a diplomatic alternative by a stray bullet, bereft of reason (the proof of a Hungarian or 
Italian hand in events, for instance), drawing significance from its transitivity with the past anticipated 
and the road to war. 
6 Bouillon (Bouillon et al. 1980) places Barthou’s ill-fated tenure as Foreign Minister in the context of 
the collapse of the collective system of international security in the early 1930s, precipitated by 
Germany’s withdrawal from the League of Nations on 14 October 1933. Barthou’s attempt to set up a 
comprehensive substitute system of mutual aid across Europe and his success in tightening France’s ties 
with the countries of the Little Entente—Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia—in the course of 
that endeavour are commended and sharply contrasted with the policies of his successor, Pierre Laval. In 
textbook histories the figure of Laval looms large over the events of 9 October 1934. 
7 The event is commemorated by a wall plaque on the Place de l’Opéra: ‘Les 22 et 23 janvier 1943, 250 
familles marseillaises ont été livrées à la gestapo par la Police de Vichy pour l’unique raison d’être nées 
juives. Déportés et exterminés dans les chambres à Gaz de Sobibor et d’Auschwitz. Hommes, femmes, 
enfants, aucun ne revint! Toi qui passe, souviens-toi! Ta mémoire est leur seule sépulture. 1943-1993 
Amicale d’Auschwitz.’ For a detailed discussion of the episode, see Crane (2004: 299-304) who 
concludes that ‘the operation was a dramatic warning intended to quell growing opposition to the German 
occupation of Marseille’ (302). 
Graves         Memory and Forgetting 
 
PORTAL, vol. 7, no. 1, January 2010.  6 
Peripheral sites and adverse memories 
Would it be fair, then, to describe 9 October 1934 as a failed site of memory, able to be 
assimilated into the cultural geographer’s conception of ‘failed place’? If we accept Tim 
Cresswell’s definition that place is space invested with meaning (2004: 10), the 
significance of the site can be considered as lost on the average citizen of Marseilles, 
though not irretrievably so, as evidenced by the periodic ‘rediscovery’ of the 
monuments on the blogosphere8—that variant on the conventional ‘arenas of 
articulation’ of memory (Ashplant et al. 2000: 17), poised between the public and the 
private domains—or in the recent efforts of the municipality to draw attention to the site 
by placing a second, heritage plaque at the corner of the Canebière and the Place du 
Général Charles de Gaulle, as a gloss on the original. 
 
In Pierre Nora’s definition, a site of memory is one ‘where memory is crystallized and 
finds refuge ... [ranging] from the material and concrete, possibly geographically 
located, to the most abstract and intellectually constructed’ (1984: 1), from the 
monument in granite or wrought iron, to the archives on paper or online, even to the 
newsreel. The site’s function is ‘to stop time, to block the process of forgetting, to 
ground an event, immortalise death, materialise the immaterial ... and embody a 
maximum of meaning in a minimum of signs’ (38). These three aspects—the material, 
the functional, and the symbolic—are complementary and co-extensive. Intention is 
seen as central to the production memory, but what of spontaneous commemorations? 
As we shall see, the commemoration of the regicide of October 9 1934 provides one 
such instance. And if location is optional, as Nora supposes, what should we make of 
Hawlbachs’s emphasis on the necessary spatial dimension: ‘place contributes to the 
stability of the material, it is when fixed in place, enclosed within its limits, and adapted 
to its conditions, that the collective thought of the group of believers is most likely to 
stablilize and last’ (1967: 165). Place provides the anchorage for and ensures the 
continuity of memory: its image ‘gives us the illusion that nothing has changed over 
time and that we can uncover the past in the present’ (167). 
 
The memorial plaque and the monument to Peace are proximate sites that nonetheless 
occupy distinctly separate spaces: the former is located in vernacular space (the 
                                                
8 For instance, see the discussion, under the title ‘Assassinat du Roi Alexandre 1er de Yougoslavie et du 
président Barthou,’ of ‘a curious monument’ near the Préfecture, which was posted to the blog ‘Muse 
s’amuse’ on 4 January 2008. 
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Canebière as a legendary public thoroughfare emblematic of the popular culture of 
Marseilles), whilst the latter lies within the bounds of civic space (the Préfecture as the 
House of State). The location of the commemorative sites within the urban geography of 
Marseilles has polarised remembrance in paradoxical ways: the Canebière’s own mythic 
status in the urban geography of France has partially eclipsed the memorial plaque, 
while the Pax Monument on the rue de Rome, though the more imposing of the two 
constructions, has been overshadowed by its proximity to the Préfecture and 
peripheralised by its distance from the main arteries of the city. 
 
The marginalistion of the Alexander-Barthou memorials raises the issue of geographical 
scale, of how sites located on the periphery of a polity’s territory are assimilated (or not) 
in the national narrative. In this instance, did the strained core-periphery relations 
between central and local government conspire to consign the regicide of 9 October 
1934 to the footnotes of history? The geography of the Marseilles site is doubly 
peripheral with a prominent extraterritorial dimension: it commemorates an alliance 
with a foreign power (Yugoslavia) and the death of a foreign prince (Alexander I), 
albeit leavened by the loss of a native son (Barthou), in the most Mediterranean and 
cosmopolitan of France’s major cities. The geography also provides a sliding scale of 
mnemonic perspective, so that French and Yugoslavian perceptions of the importance of 
the assassination differ markedly, as do points of view within France: remembrance at 
the centre (Paris) and on the periphery (Marseilles) diverge significantly in the 
importance accorded to the event.  
 
A related issue is that of the preservation of negative or traumatic episodes in collective 
memory. In particular, what we might term ‘adverse memory,’ a sub-category of 
‘traumatic memory’ which includes assassination and political violence, natural 
catastrophes and accidents inducing collective trauma, such as the fire in the Nouvelles 
Galeries on the Canebière in 1938 that claimed the lives of 73 people. Blamed on the 
incompetence of the municipal fire service, it moved central government to suspend the 
Mayor and municipal council and place Marseilles under the tutelage of a special 
administrator (Nora 1984: 196). Political violence tends to generate a marginality of its 
own: in this instance, the assassination is seen to have reinforced ‘la mauvaise 
réputation’ of Marseilles as the French Chicago of the 1930s (Joutard 1998: 196). 
Adverse memories are arguably easier to assimilate when they are battles lost in wars 
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won—the ‘Dunkirk spirit’ would be the clearest example. Antoine Prost makes the 
point in his contribution to Nora’s Lieux de Mémoire on the ‘Monuments to the Fallen’ 
in the Prussian and Great Wars: ‘Is there less reason to remember 1871 than the victory 
of 1918? [Are these] monuments to the dead, or monuments to victory?’ (1984: 196).9 
While the case of Marseilles is one of civic rather than war memory, and amounts to a 
diplomatic battle lost well before the outbreak of hostilities, the Second World War is 
omnipresent in its recollection, although not as a victory: the Defeat of France and the 
Vichy regime cast a long retrospective shadow over the events of October 1934 in 
Marseilles. 
 
The struggle over memory 
The public records reveal that the memorialisation of the double assassination was 
fraught with political controversy and rivalry, between central and local government as 
well as between the municipality and other memorial agencies in Marseilles (notably the 
regional press) against a background of local and national party tensions. The 
commemoration is essentially a tale of two cities—Marseilles and Paris—and of two 
monuments (aside from the commemorative plaque on the Canebière in Marseilles): the 
Peace or Pax Monument at the Préfecture and the Monument to Peter I of Serbia, and to 
his son, Alexander I of Yugoslavia, at the Place de la Muette in Paris. Significantly, it 
was the Parisian monument, the farthest removed geographically from the scene of 
events—which was the first of the two to be inaugurated, on 9th October 1936, the 
second anniversary of the assassination of Alexander I and of Louis Barthou, at a 
ceremony led by the President of the Republic Albert Lebrun, who delivered the eulogy 
(‘L’amitié franco-yougoslav’ 1936: 1) ‘exalting the friendship between the two nations, 
sealed by the blood of their heroes and their martyrs’ (‘L’hommage de la France’ 1936: 
1). That the Parisian memorial should have taken precedence over the provincial project 
is an indication of how swift the capital was to assert its ascendancy in the political 
tussle over the rights to remembrance. In this, Paris held a material advantage over 
Marseilles: sculptor Maxime Réal del Sarte’s model for a monument to Peter I, King of 
Serbia, which Alexander was to have viewed in Paris in the course of his ill-fated state 
visit, was opportunistically extended to include statues of both the fallen king and his 
                                                
9 ‘La défaite de 1871 se serait moins prêtée à commémoration que la victoire de 1918? ... Monuments aux 
morts, ou monuments de la victoire?’ (Nora 1984: 196). However, in France’s First World War 
experience, Prost found monuments that were built before the outcome of the war was known or even 
knowable (196).  
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former companion-at-arms Marshal Franchet d’Esperey, in a triptych symbolising 
Franco-Yugoslavian friendship (Degastines 2003).  
 
The timeline of the official response to the double assassination of 9th October 1934 
reveals a race to memorialise its victims, which was to bring the principal memorial 
agencies in Paris and Marseilles into open conflict and expose their opposing interests. 
Initially, the municipality appeared to have seized the initiative when on Saturday 13 
October 1934, the day of Louis Barthou’s state funeral, the Mayor of Marseilles 
Georges Ribot called an extraordinary meeting of the municipal council (‘Le Conseil 
Municipal de Marseille’ 1934: 1). The council unanimously adopted four 
commemorative resolutions put forward by the mayor to honour the victims of 9 
October: to name the square opposite the Bourse after Alexander I and one of the streets 
in the new development behind the Bourse after Louis Barthou; to build a memorial 
jetty on the Quai des Belges, composed of two columns bearing the effigies of 
Alexander and Barthou, where Alexander I landed in Marseilles; to place a 
commemorative plaque on the corner of the Place de la Bourse and the Canebière where 
the drama unfolded; and finally, to delegate the Mayor to attend Alexander’s state 
funeral in Belgrade (‘Le Conseil Municipal a rendu’ 1934: 1). Of the monuments and 
memorials proposed, only the plaque survives today. The square Alexander I opposite 
the Bourse was rebaptised square Charles de Gaulle in 1970 (Bles 2001: 208–9),10 the 
rue Louis Barthou never materialised and plans for the memorial jetty, which was to 
have been the centrepiece of the municipality’s commemorative project, were shelved.11  
 
The tensions which were to frustrate the resolution of the municipal council are already 
apparent in two communiqués which the Mayor published in quick succession in the 
wake of the extraordinary council meeting: the first rejects accusations of negligence 
levelled against the city authorities by unnamed sources in the national press; the second 
excoriates the authors of an electoral poster exploiting the death of Louis Barthou for 
electoral purposes (‘Le Conseil Municipal de Marseille’ 1934: 1). Dr Ribot protested 
that the municipality had been kept in the dark about the security arrangements made for 
                                                
10 Confusingly, the historic index of the streets of Marseilles refers to the Square Alexandre I as the 
‘garden’ of the place Général-de-Gaulle, but it is not named as such either on the ground or in 
contemporary street-plans of the city (Bles 2001: 24). 
11 In a memorial lecture given in Marseilles on 10 November 1934, the editor-in-chief of Bourrageas’s 
Petit Marseillais announced that an ‘expiatory’ monument would be erected to Alexander I in the square 
opposite the Bourse. Again, this was never to materialise and appears not to have featured in the 
municipality’s original plans. (Bancal 1935: 31). 
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the King’s visit and could be in no way held responsible for the lapse in security which 
led to his and Barthou’s deaths. The assassination took place between the two rounds of 
the local elections in Marseilles which were being contested by a new party, the Front 
Français, a heteroclite anti-Popular Front and anti-Marxist formation founded by Simon 
Sabiani, Deputy Mayor, Member of Parliament for Marseilles’s 3rd district, and the 
power behind the throne in local politics (Témime 2006: 153).12 In the new party’s 
ranks, the Radical mayor Ribot—‘une personnalité radicale de second ordre’ (a radical 
of the second division) according to one historian (Témime 2006: 157)—rubbed 
shoulders with figures as dissimilar as the ultra-conservative press baron Gustave 
Bourrageas, former militants of the socialist Section Française de l’Internationale 
Ouvrière (SFIO, French Section of the Workers International) and prominent figures of 
the Marseilles bourgeoisie. The conflict between Paris and Marseilles over the 
memorialisation thus unfolded against a background of local party political rivalry, with  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Postcard of Square Alexandre 1er. A. Tardy, photographer, circa 1934. All rights reserved. 
Alexander I Square was rebaptised Place du Général Charles de Gaulle in 1970. 
                                                
12 Alèssi Dell’Umbria describes Sabiani, who became Deputy Mayor in 1929 under Ribot’s predecessor 
Siméon Flaissières, as ‘a loose cannon’ in the political landscape of Marseille, ‘an authentic capo of the 
municipality for four years’ (2006: 477). 
Graves         Memory and Forgetting 
 
PORTAL, vol. 7, no. 1, January 2010.  11 
ramifications at the national level as well as in the regional broadsheet press: Marseille 
Matin backed Sabiani and Ribot; the bestselling Petit Marseillais, which supported the 
conservative shipyard owners in the inter-war years, was owned by Bourrageas.13 
 
In his address to the emergency council meeting of 13 October, Mayor Ribot pledged to 
place the municipality and the people of Marseilles in the vanguard of the public appeal 
to commemorate the deaths of their distinguished visitors (‘Le Conseil Municipal de 
Marseille’ 1934: 1). Unbeknown to him, Paris had already pre-empted that ambition: on 
10 October 1934 Marshal Franchet d’Esperey, hero of the Balkan campaign, former 
comrade-in-arms of Alexander I and Honorary President of the Association of the 
Friends of Yugoslavia, had formed a special committee ‘to build a monument in 
Marseilles which would perpetuate the memory of our glorious Friend and Ally’ 
(Archives Municipales 1934–36).14 The monument was to be located in Marseilles, but 
built under the direction of his Paris-based veterans’ association. Preoccupied with the 
repatriation of Alexander’s mortal remains to Belgrade, the mayor seems to have had no 
knowledge of the Special Committee’s existence, but his sometime ally and political 
rival Bourrageas evidently did: he cabled Franchet d’Esperey, informing him that his 
paper the Petit Marseillais had launched its own commemorative appeal 48 hours 
earlier and suggesting a meeting in Paris ‘for mutual assistance [and] amicable 
conversation’ (Archives Municipales 1934–36).15 That meeting, chaired by d’Esperey 
on 13 October at the offices of the Association, brought together the principal memorial 
agencies with the notable exclusion of the municipality of Marseilles, including 
representatives of: the Government (in the person of Louis Marin, Minister of Education 
and Health); Parliament (Edouard Soulier, MP and Vice-Chairman of the Foreign 
Affairs Committee); the Friends of Yugoslavia Association; the veterans’ organisation 
la Fédération Nationale des Poilus d’Orient; the ex-prisoners of war association la 
Fédération Nationale des Evadés de Guerre; and the Franco-Yugoslavian Chamber of 
Commerce. The sole representative from Marseilles in attendance was Gustave 
Bourrageas, in his capacity as Director of the Petit Marseillais and President of the 
                                                
13 From the end of the 19th century until 1944, the regional broadsheet press in Provence was dominated 
by Le Petit Marseillais. Founded and owned by the Bourrageas family, it was a notoriously reactionary 
paper on the hard right of the political spectrum, and was nicknamed ‘le journal des curés’ or the ‘parish 
priest’s paper’ (Journal Officiel de la République Française 1986: 4647). In the inter-war years, Le Petit 
Marseillais supported the shipping interest in Marseilles.  
14 ‘pour l’érection d’un monument qui perpétuerait à Marseille, la mémoire du glorieux Ami et Allié.’ 
15 ‘[pour] concours [et] conversation amicale.’ 
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regional press syndicate. The assembled delegates decided that two monuments would 
be built: the first in Paris, dedicated to the two kings—Alexander I and Peter I—on the 
basis of Maxime Real Del Sarte’s study,16 the second to the victims of the assassination 
of 9 October in Marseilles. The appeal would be directed by an Honorary Committee in 
Paris, presided by Franchet d’Esperey, while the building work would be overseen by 
two executive committees, the first based in Paris, chaired by the MP Edouard Soulier, 
the second in Marseilles, chaired by Gustave Bourrageas. 
 
The Mayor of Marseilles was not invited to the Paris meeting; nor was he informed of 
the decisions concerning his city which he seems to have gleaned subsequently from the 
local press: Marseille Matin commented scathingly on Bourrageas’ appointment in its 
edition of 18 October (‘Comité exécutif’ 1934: n.p.), to which Bourrageas exercised a 
curt right of reply on 21 October. The earliest documentary evidence that Ribot knew of 
the appointment comes from a letter of protest addressed to Franchet d’Esperey on 23 
October 1934: ‘The city of Marseilles decided to erect a monument to the King 
immediately following the assassination. Mr Bourageas’ nomination can only be 
provisional, because the chairmanship [of the Marseilles committee] belongs by right to 
the Mayor of Marseille. Mr Bourrageas only represents a fraction of public opinion’ 
(Archives Municipales 1934–36).17 In the archives, Franchet d’Esperey’s reply is dated 
‘13 October, in the evening,’ though it was only delivered to the Mairie de Marseille ten 
days later, on 23 October. Clearly it has been antedated: the recipient (Ribot in person?) 
has underlined the offending detail twice using the Mayor’s trademark blue crayon. 
Without referring to Ribot’s letter (had he received it, or anticipated it?), the author is 
magnaminous: the committee over which he presides has decided to erect two 
monuments, one in Paris, the other in Marseilles, which will be ‘the work of 
Marseillais’: ‘Having accepted the Presidency of the Honorary Committee, in the name 
of both [executive] committees I would like to invite you, as Mayor, to associate your 
name and title with the project, by consenting to join our Honorary Committee as Vice-
                                                
16 ‘Les Amis de la Yougoslavie’ had planned to build a monument to Peter I of Serbia in Orléans, where 
he had distinguished himself while serving with the French Army in 1870 by escaping across the Loire in 
spite of his wounds. A rival association, la Fédération des Evadés de Guerre (The Federation of Escaped 
Prisoners of War), wanted to erect the monument in Paris. The capital was to take precedence. 
17 ‘La ville de Marseille a décidé d’ériger un monument au roi dès l’assassinat. La nomination de M. 
Bourrageas ne pourrait être que provisoire car la présidence doit revenir au Maire de Marseille. M. 
Bourrageas ne représente qu’une fraction de l’opinion.’  
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President’ (Archives Municipales 1934–36).18 At the same time, the Marshal 
ostentatiously pulls rank: his organisation is under ‘the High Patronage of the President 
of the Republic’; he has extended the same invitation to the Minister Louis Marin, to 
Admiral Lacaze (former Minister for the Navy) and to Mr Contenot, Mayor of Paris; he 
expects ‘the moral support and active collaboration of the Marseilles Municipal 
Council’ (Archives Municipales 1934–36).19 
 
There follows a long and muddled exchange, complicated by letters overlapping—
where one takes ten days to travel from Paris to Marseilles others take two—and 
underscored by mutual suspicions of bad faith. After the initial exchange, d’Esperey’s 
letters are written on official, headed note-paper from the General Court Martial. On 25 
October, Franchet d’Esperey writes again claiming to have just received Ribot’s protest. 
The tone is more conciliatory: his commemorative committee knew nothing of the 
Marseilles Municipal Council’s deliberations when it met on 13 October, only of the 
public appeal launched by the regional press; Bourrageas had been invited as the 
director of Marseilles’ leading paper; but the council meeting changes everything—
D’Esperey asks Bourrageas to meet with and defer to the Mayor. Ribot accepts his 
intercession by letter of the same date: ‘I am particularly pleased to have received your 
letter which, I hope, will put an end to this little local misunderstanding which might 
otherwise have degenerated into a regrettable dispute’ (Archives Municipales 1934–
36).20 However, the affair was far from over. By October 31, it is clear from the ensuing 
correspondence that Bourrageas has refused to stand down as chairman of the 
Marseilles executive committee, or even to accept the Mayor as co-chairman. Ribot is 
prepared to cede the chair, but only if Bourrageas withdraws in favour of a ‘suitably 
qualified veteran’ of the Great War. The Mayor holds firm on the principle that where 
any public commemoration in Marseilles is concerned, the local, elected authority must 
take precedence over other, external or non-elective agencies. 
 
As the period of public mourning began and the municipality erected a temporary 
Cenotaph to Alexander I and Louis Barthou on the Place de la Bourse, the quarrel 
                                                
18 ‘Ayant accepté la Présidence du Comité d’Honneur, je viens vous demander, Monsieur le Maire, au 
nom des deux Comités, de bien vouloir associer votre nom et votre qualité à l’oeuvre entreprise, en 
acceptant d’entrer dans notre Comité d’Honneur, comme vice-président.’ 
19 ‘l’appui moral et la collaboration du Conseil Muncipal de Marseille.’ 
20 ‘Je suis particulièrement heureux d’avoir reçu votre lettre qui, je l’espère, mettra fin à quelques petits 
malentendus locaux susceptibles de dégénérer en regrettables dissentiments.’ 
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rumbled on into November, with Bourrageas obstinately refusing to meet the Mayor. 
The archival evidence shows that Dr. Ribot had kept his deputy, the MP Sabiani 
informed of developments and enjoyed his continuing support. We know that moderate 
politicians of the Left and the Right at the National Assembly regarded Sabiani’s 
demagogy and links to the Marseilles mafia with deep suspicion: on 29 November 1934 
Sabiani had organised a public conference at the Salle des Ambassadeurs in Paris to 
promote his pamphlet about the Marseilles killings that laid the blame on an occult 
‘Judeo-Masonic’ conspiracy with the support of international high finance, revealing 
nothing of substance beyond the extent of his own swing to the far right, which would 
culminate in a condemnation to death in absentia for collaboration at the Liberation 
(Sabiani 1934).21 Did concern in Parisian circles about Sabiani’s hold on the Marseilles 
Town Hall fan the flames of discord over the selection and siting of the memorials? 
Whatever the contributing factors, tensions between the parties still ran high in the 
summer of 1935.22 
 
In the course of the controversy, the Mayor of Marseilles became a symbol of provincial 
resistance to Jacobin Paris. On 14 December 1934, invited to close the annual congress 
of the Association of the Mayors of France as keynote speaker, Ribot seized the 
opportunity to deliver a vibrant requisitory against central government: 
 
The city which I administer has had enough of being treated as a den of vice and a cradle of 
terrorism. Marseilles has never received enough help from central goverment, in spite of its 
considerable efforts to expand its economy and overseas trade (...) We wish to remain the true 
                                                
21 Robert Mencherini reproduces Sabiani’s public lecture in an appendix to his study of the crisis years of 
1930-40 in Marseilles, Midi rouge, ombres et lumières–1 (2004). 
22 The quarrel came to a head again at the end of the first week in November: on 6 November, Bourrageas 
called a meeting of the Marseilles Executive Committee for 9 November, to be held at the Préfecture 
instead of the Mairie. Informed belatedly on 8 November, the Mayor cabled Franchet d’Esperey in Paris: 
‘Comité Exécutif Marseille devait se rendre à la mairie. J’apprends avec surprise convocation à la 
Préfecture pour demain. Stop. Dans ces conditions le Maire de Marseille pose sa candidature à la 
Présidence du Comité de Marseille. Sentiments Respectueux. Dr. Ribot, Maire de Marseille’ (Archives 
Municipales 1934–36) (Marseilles Executive Committee due to meet at Town Hall. To my surprise, learn 
meeting called for tomorrow at Préfecture. Under such conditions, Mayor of Marseilles candidate for 
chairmanship of Marseilles Committee. Sincerely yours. Dr. Ribot. Mayor of Marseilles). The threat to 
oust the Paris appointee was not carried out, but d’Esperey’s response was disingenuous: he asked the 
Prefect to intercede: ‘Il nous est impossible de Paris de trancher une question toute locale’ (We are in no 
position to resolve a fundamentally local affair from Paris). An annotation in Ribot’s hand suggests the 
incident is over, but the controversy would carry over into December, when the Mayor’s office rejected a 
request from the Paris executive committee for a financial contribution to the Parisian monument, and 
would reignite in the spring and summer of 1935, when there was further discord between the town hall 
and the Marseilles committee over who should organise the national appeal day locally. When Bourrageas 
called a meeting of the executive committee for the Alexander I-Barthou monument at the Hôtel de Ville 
for 5 p.m. on July 3, he omitted to inform the Mayor until 4.20 p.m. of the same evening! (Archives 
Municipales 1934–36). 
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decision-makers in our cities, living in constant touch with our own citizens (...) The primary and 
indispensable units of national life, the town halls constitute the backbone of the regime and the 
buttress of its governance. They want greater freedom. (‘Le congrès de l’association’ 1934: 
n.p.)23 
 
The polemic between Paris and Marseilles on the one hand, and between the Mairie and 
the d’Esperey committee’s proxy in Marseilles on the other, meant that, more than a 
year after the assassination, the municipality was still no closer to putting into effect the 
memorial project voted at the emergency council meeting of the previous October. A 
memo from the councillor for the Beaux-Arts of 7 December 1935 features only one of 
the original resolutions—the Alexander I Square opposite the Bourse—in its list of four 
proposals. Of these, the last, an addition to the site of the Monument des Poilus d’Orient 
on the Corniche, is crossed out in red. Why? We can only speculate that the conflict 
with Franchet d’Esperey’s veterans’ association made it unacceptable to the Town Hall. 
It still features in fourth position of a list of sites in a subsequent memo of 16 July 1936, 
from which the Alexander I Square has been deleted. The monumental jetty on the Quai 
des Belges, once a realistic enough prospect for the municipality to have commissioned 
a study by the local firm of architects Grebe, had long since been shelved. When 
President Lebrun inaugurated the Parisian monument in autumn 1936 on the second 
anniversary of the death of Alexander I, in Marseilles the Pax Monument [see figure 3] 
had yet to make it onto the drawing board of its designer-to-be, Gaston Castel (Drocourt 
1988: 115). Building work on the monument outside the Préfecture would not begin 
until January 1938 (Noet 2009), the year in which Castel presented the award-winning 
model of his ‘National Monument to King Alexander of Yugoslavia and President 
Barthou’ at the Salon des artistes français (‘Monument national’ 1938: 1).24 
 
By the summer of 1938, plans were being laid for President Albert Lebrun to inaugurate 
the Marseilles monument, a full two years after its false twin on the Place de la Muette 
in Paris had been consecrated. By then, Georges Ribot was no longer Mayor of 
Marseilles, having been been defeated in the municipal elections of 5–12 May 1935 by 
                                                
23 ‘La ville que j’administre en a assez d’être traitée de sentine du monde et de foyer naturel des attentats. 
Marseille n’a jamais été aidée suffisamment par le pouvoir central, malgré ses gros efforts personnels 
d’expansion commerciale et maritime .... Nous désirons rester les véritables chefs de nos cités ; vivant en 
contact permanent avec nos populations .... Cellules premières et indispensables de la nation, les mairies 
constituent l’ossature du régime et le soutien des forces nationales, elles demandent plus de liberté.’ 
24 The call for tender for the Marseilles monument was eventually made in May 1937. The Castel 
memorial project, entitled ‘Pax et travail’ (Peace and work) was shortlisted and subsequently selected on 
4 October 1937, but construction work did not begin until January 1938 and took a year to complete. 
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Figure 3: Castel’s Pax monument © Matthew Graves 
 
Henri Tasso, the leader of the Socialist and Communist alliance, the Common Front 
(Busquet 1998: 386). The new mayor’s deputy wrote on 16 August 1938 to inform him 
about preparations for the presidential visit ‘at the end of the year,’ enclosing a detailed 
program, including an official banquet at the Bourse and a gala evening at the Opera. 
However, on the 18 August a handwritten note from the Secretary General of the Mairie 
to the Director of the Beaux Arts mentions that the presidential visit ‘has been 
postponed by several months’ (Archives Municipales 1938).25 It was never to 
materialise. No explanation is given, but we know that the construction of the 
monument at the Préfecture was not completed until 22 December 1938 (Castel 2009). 
In the interval, an unrelated incident would consummate the political divorce between 
                                                
25 ‘a été reportée de quelques mois.’ 
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central government and the Marseilles municipality, and make any presidential visit 
unthinkable.  
 
Counter-memories 
The fire that engulfed the Nouvelles Galeries on the Canebière on 28 October 1938, 
claiming seventy-three lives, was witnessed by the President of the Council Daladier, 
the President of the Assembly Herriot, and the Minister of the Interior Sarraut, all of 
whom were attending the National Congress of the Radical Party nearby. The ensuing 
controversy over the responsibility of the municipal authorities, compounded by the 
political and personal antipathy between the Radical Daladier and the Socialist Tasso, 
led to the decree of 20 March 1939 that deprived Marseilles of its elected Mayor and 
placed the city under the tutelage of central government in the person of a special 
administrator appointed directly by the President of the Republic,26 ‘a colonial 
governor’ in the words of its senior councillor (Baratier 1973: 421). In August 1940, the 
functions of special administrator and prefect for the department of the Bouches-du-
Rhône would be merged in the person of a single ‘Prefect adminstrator-delegate’ 
(Busquet 1998: 387). The final chapter in the long-running feud between the Mairie and 
central government would thus see the centre of gravity in decision-making shift 
decisively and durably (the ‘régime d’exception’ would last until the Liberation in 
August 1944) from the Town Hall to the Préfecture, just as the national monument to 
Alexander-Barthou rose from the ground outside it.  
 
Under these conditions, and in the deteriorating national and international political 
climate, it is hardly suprising that the Pax Monument would never be given a republican 
inauguration or indeed serve the memorial purpose for which it was originally designed. 
By the time of its completion, the Popular Front government had lost power and the Pax 
Gallica for which it stood was increasingly equated with appeasement. The foreign 
policy pursued by Alexander I’s successor, the Prince Regent Paul, had carried 
Yugoslavia into the diplomatic orbit of the Axis. There is no record of the site being 
used for public ceremony before the Second World War. However, on 28 March 1941, 
with Marseilles now under the tutelage of the Vichy government, it became the scene of 
the first major public protest against the Axis powers in Marseilles. In celebration of the 
                                                
26 B.M.O. no 1901 du 25 mars 1939. Stripped of his mayoral attributes, Henri Tasso was demoted to the 
chairmanship of the Municipal Council. 
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pro-Allied coup d’état which brought Alexander’s son, Peter II, to power in Yugoslavia 
on 27 March 1941, the students’ resistance movement in Marseilles organised the 
flowering of the commemorative plaque opposite the Bourse as well as of the Barthou-
Alexander monument outside the Préfecture, stuffing their bouquets with anti-German 
propaganda (‘La Manifestation Patriotique’ 2005: 16). They were joined by thousands 
of Marseillais in a popular gesture of defiance which was surprisingly tolerated by the 
police, who are reported to have removed the bouquets the following day only to 
deposit them minus the anti-German tracts, at the foot of the Monument aux Mobiles de 
1870 commemorating the Franco-Prussian war (16). Bourrageas’s paper the pro-Vichy 
Le Petit Marseillais, pointedly downplayed the incident as the spontaneous outpouring 
of loyalty by members of the Yugoslavian community of Marseilles (‘Des fleurs sur la 
plaque’ 1941: 1),27 but the international press saw it as a turning point in the public’s 
perception of the Vichy regime (‘Thousands in Marseilles’ 1941: 1).28  
 
On 20 June 1941, the Pax Monument was finally inaugurated, almost seven years after 
the event it was designed to commemorate, when the Marseilles executive committee 
handed over responsibility for the site to the city authorities in a low-key ceremony held 
in the absence of any senior government official (‘La remise à la ville’ 1941: 2). Was 
the ceremony designed as the Vichy administration’s response to the public protests of 
27 March, in an effort to ‘normalise’ the monument and restore its official 
commemorative purpose as a symbol of a pro-Axis Franco-Yugoslavian alliance? If that 
is the case, it is perhaps no accident that the inauguration should coincide with the flight 
of Peter II to London at the head of the Yugoslavian government in exile (‘Le roi Pierre 
II’ 1941: 3).  
 
Conclusion 
The core-periphery tensions over the memorialisation of 9 October 1934 delayed the 
building of the Marseilles monument to such an extent that by the time it was unveiled 
it had lost much of its symbolic significance. Indeed, in the wake of the assassination, 
Yugoslavia became diplomatically estranged from France, eventually forming the 
Tripartite Pact with the Axis, and by 1938 the Franco-Yugoslavian special relationship 
                                                
27 Gustave Bourrageas died in 1940 and was succeeded by first Paul and later Jean Gaillard-Bourrageas. 
The latter was condemned to death at the Liberation for collaboration. 
28 The same source reports that the statue of King Peter I of Serbia, Alexander’s father and Peter II’s 
grandfather, was bombed in Zagreb on 29 March, a case of a memorial becoming the target of symbolic 
violence. 
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was null and void. Furthermore, under pressure from d’Esperay’s Paris committee, the 
relocation of the Marseilles monument to official, civic space outside the Préfecture 
deprived the memorial of its vernacular meaning as the ‘people’s monument’ and 
thereby of its expiatory function as a conduit for adverse memory. As the controversy 
over the memorial mounted, opinion in the Marseilles press and other public forums 
would repeatedly question whether a monument should be built at all—wouldn’t it be 
better to forget what amounted to a stain on the city’s reputation? With the demise of 
the Popular Front and the advent of the Second World War, the very idea of a 
monument to the Peace must have seemed redundant. Thereafter, the Marseilles 
monument could only function effectively as a site of counter-memory, briefly 
becoming the focus for popular resistance to the Vichy regime and to the German 
occupation of France, in the form of a spontaneous commemoration which was as much 
about the living (Peter II) and the political present as it was about the dead (Alexander I). 
Arguably, the failure of the Marseilles monument as a site of memory has been 
compounded by the relegation of the episode to the footnotes of national history, a 
process in which the foreign ministeries of Britain and France, in their readiness to 
forego an international enquiry and ‘forget’ in the interests of appeasement, initially 
played no small part (Kovrig 1976). The subsequent course of European history would 
do the rest: after 1945, the Cold War, the exile of the Yugoslavian monarchy, the advent 
of Tito’s communist regime, and the demise of the Franco-Yugoslavian alliance, would 
deprive Marseilles and France of reasons to remember the events of 9 October 1934. 
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